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CASE COMMENTS
plans which have represented the extremity of issues concerning
which management must bargain? It does involve an additional
relationship between an employer and his employees, namely, land-
lord-tenant.
Though it may be said that this subject stands on the extremity
of mandatory fringe issues to be bargained, have not the two
courts been unduly restrictive in saying that only when rentals
have been lower than the community average do such become a
matter to be bargained within the meaning of "wages?" Is this
a fair test; rather, does it not discriminate against the employer
who has unilaterally granted a "value" to his employees-as in the
Lehigh case, a lower than average rent over a period of years? And
does it not mean that once an employer grants an "emolument of
value" to his employees, henceforth any proposed variation thereof
becomes a subject to be bargained; whereas, the employees are
denied the benefits of compulsory collective bargaining to secure
an "emolument."
Hours of work are not to be bargained only when management
proposes an increase nor rates of pay only when about to be
decreased. They are also to be bargained when the employees seek
to modify them so as to increase their benefits. By the same token
should it not be mandatory that management bargain collectively
with its employees when the latter propose to make rentals on
company-owned houses an emolument of value by a decrease in
rent payments? Should it not likewise be mandatory that the
employer bargain when the employees propose to inaugurate a
"wage" as when the employer grants a wage and then seeks to vary
it? If this reasoning be adopted, then the matters about which
management must bargain will be greatly expanded, for example,
prices of goods sold in company-owned stores.
C. R. M.
LEGISLATION-SEPARABILITY CLAUSES IN STATUTES-CUMULATIVE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ITEMS IN APPROPRIATIONS AcTs.-In an original
proceeding in mandamus brought by the state board of school
finance to require the state auditor to honor a requisition pertain-
ing to state aid for schools, the auditor's answer challenged the
constitutionality of the budget act as passed by the legislature
during the regular session of 1953. The Supreme Court of Appeals
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held the act to be unconstitutional in its entirety, as being contrary
to the provisions of Section 51 of Article VI of the Constitution of
West Virginia . The court held that the legislature's act of substi-
tuting its estimate of funds available for appropriation for that of
the Board of Public Works, its acts of amending the budget bill as
submitted to it by the Board of Public Works by adding new
items, increasing items not relating to either the legislative or
judiciary departments, reducing items for the judiciary department,
were all prohibited by Section 51 of Article VI, commonly known
as "The Budget Amendment." State ex rel. Trent v. Sims, 77 S.E.2d
122 (W.Va. 1953).
Petitioners contended that even though some of the items of
the appropriation bill were found to be unconstitutional, the
whole bill should not fall, relying on saving clauses in both the
budget amendment and the budget act, which expressly provide
that should some portions of the bill be found invalid, such
invalidity should not affect the legality of the bill or of any other
item thereof.
The general rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes is
that a statute may be valid in part and invalid in part. If the
parts are independent, or separable, but not otherwise, the invalid
part may be rejected and the valid part may stand, provided it is
complete in itself and capable of enforcement. Allen v. Louisiana,
103 U.S. 80 (1880); State ex rel. Broughton et al. v. Zimmerman,
261 Wis. 398, 52 N.W.2d 903 (1952). This rule has long been
recognized in West Virginia. Eckhart v. State, 5 W. Va. 515 (1872).
A statute is held to be separable where after striking out the
invalid portion, the remaining provisions are complete in them-
selves and would have been adopted by the legislature had it fore-
seen the partial invalidity, Morganti v. Morganti, 99 Cal. App.2d
512, 222 P.2d 78 (1950), if the remaining part is sufficient to ac-
complish the legislature's main purpose, Moseley v. State, 176 Ga.
889, 169 S.E. 97 (1933), if the valid portion may be sufficient for
practical working purposes, Oliver & Son v. Chicago, R.I. k P. Ry.,
69 Ark. 446, 117 S.W. 238 (1909), and when the stricken and remain-
ing provisions are not mutually dependent on one another. Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 288 (1936).
In the absence of a provision that invalidity of a part of a
statute shall not affect the remainder, there is a presumption that
the legislature did not contemplate the enforcement of the statute
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except as a whole. Danielley v. City of Princeton, 113 W. Va. 252,
167 S.E. 620 (1933). However, the West Virginia court has also
said in Meisel v. Tri-State Airport Authority, 135 W. Va. 528, 64
S.E.2d 32 (1951), that it will be presumed that the legislature
intended to enact a valid and effective statute, and therefore when
it proves partially invalid, the remainder will not fail where it
reflects legislative intent and is complete in itself.
But where the statute contains a saving clause the effect is
somewhat different. Such saving clauses are recognized as valid
and are not an invalid delegation of legislative authority or a
presentation of an inconsistent alternative. Snetzer v. Gregg, 129
Ark. 542, 196 S.W. 925 (1917). However, a saving clause is invalid
in so far as it attempts to control the judicial construction of a
statute. Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 182 S.W.2d 86 (1944).
The legislature is clearly incompetent to place a binding construc-
tion on a constitutional provision, as such function belongs to the
judiciary. State v. Shumate, 172 Tenn. 451, 113 S.W.2d 381 (1938).
The effect of such a statutory declaration is to create, not the pre.
sumption of entirety in effect ordinarily accorded to statutes, but
an opposite presumption of separability. Stewart Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Its presence raises the presumption
that the legislature intended the court to consider and apply the
separate provisions of a statute rather than the statute as a whole.
Lingamfelter v. Brown, 132 W. Va. 566, 52 S.E.2d 687 (1949). But
a saving clause is not absolute and, when the presumption of
severability is overcome by a showing of the indivisible character
of the act, the whole must fall with an invalid portion, regardless
of the presence of such saving clause. Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936). And in the same case the Supreme Court
said that the clause would not be effective where it is obvious that
the remainder could not, or would not, be intended to stand as the
legislative will. Such a clause has been held merely declaratory of
the rules already laid down by the courts. Springfield Gas Co. v.
Springfield, 292 Ill. 236, 126 N.E. 739 (1920). In Carter v. Carter
Coal Co. it was said that the effect of a saving clause was to shift
the burden of showing separability; where there is such a provision
the burden is on the assailant to show inseparability, and where
there is none it is on the supporter of the legislation to show
separability.
3
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In the principal case the court had two such saving clauses to
contend with; one in the budget act itself-a declaration of intent
by the legislature, and one in Article VI of the Constitution-a
declaration of intent by the electorate. The court declared in its
holding that, "... a saving clause is merely an aid to interpretation
of a constitution or statute, and will not be held to operate so as to
thwart the intent of the electorate ... or the legislative intent." At
page 140. The unconstitutional items were held to be so numerous
and extensive that, if they were stricken from the act, the result
would be entirely different from that intended by the legislature.
It has been said that authority to eliminate from a statute
invalid provisions does not flow from legislative authority con-
tained in a saving clause but from the inherent power of the court.
State v. Calhoun County, 126 Fla. 376, 170 So. 883 (1936). It would
seem that the authority might be of a different quality when
flowing from a constitutional provision. It was said, in Bacon
Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 21, 248 Pac. 235 (1926), that a
saving clause is mere evidence of legislative intent and not binding
on the court. However, that court was not faced with a saving
clause in the constitution, but in the statute only. In the principal
case, the court, in overriding the saving clauses, based its decision
on the fact that the resulting budget act would be a totally different
one than that intended by the legislature, and such a result under
the budget amendment would be contrary to the one intended by
the electorate.
Courts have long held that they have the power to strike out
invalid items from an appropriation act without invalidating the
whole, even in the absence of an applicable saving clause. State
v. Clinton, 28 La. Ann. 201 (1876). That certain items should not
be contained in a general appropriation bill will not affect validity
or constitutionality of the remainder. State Board of Health v.
Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 231, 23 P.2d 941 (1933). And where the state
constitution gives the governor the power of item vote, the court
should follow the presumption of severability. Parker v. Bates,
216 S.C. 52, 56 S.E.2d 723 (1949). It was held in State ex rel.
Fraser v. Gay, 158 Fla. 465, 28 So.2d 901 (1947), that the invalid
provisions of the general appropriations act were not so inter-
dependent as to invalidate the remainder of the act. The West
Virginia court held, in construing the 1921 budget bill, that it
was constitutional even though such construction does not neces-
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sarily apply to each item embraced therein. State v. Bond, 94
W. Va. 255, 118 S.E. 276 (1923).
However, the court does not set a limit on the number of items
of equal rank required to be stricken from an appropriation bill
to result in an act contrary to legislative intent. Here seventy-one
items were found to be unconstitutional and that was held to be
"too numerous and extensive." In In re Opinion of the Justices,
45 R.I. 289, 120 Atl. 868 (1923), it was the opinion of the court
that if a general appropriation act, containing distinct and sep-
arable provisions for public and private purposes, were passed by
a majority of a quorum, it would not be declared invalid as a
whole, but merely as to the appropriations for private purposes
which required a two-thirds majority of elected members. And a
Wisconsin appropriation bill was upheld where two purposes were
invalid but the remaining four important purposes were valid.
State ex rel. Wisconsin Development Authority v. Dommann, 228
Wis. 147, 280 N.W. 698 (1938).
It is clear from the reported cases that the general rules regard-
ing separability of statutes and saving clauses are applied to
appropriation bills and general statutes alike, and that the number
of invalid provisions is effective only as a guide to show legislative
intent. State ex rel. Hudson v. Carter, 167 Okla. 32, 27 P.2d 617
(1934), spells out the test, "Where the valid portions of a general
appropriation act are so separate and distinct from the invalid
portions thereof that it may be presumed that the legislature
would have enacted the valid portions thereof without the invalid
portions if it had known of the invalidity," and elision from the
act of the invalid portions leaves "a consistent and workable act
complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with
the apparent legislative intent," the valid parts of the act will be
given effect. Id. at 42, 27 P.2d at 626.
G. W. S. G.
UNFAIR COMAPETITION-NEws-LITERARY PROPERTY.-D, the op-
erator of a radio station, which competed with P's newspaper for
advertising, broadcast news from the newspaper, the broadcast
coinciding in point of time with the completion of distribution of
the newspaper to subscribers. Held, that a motion to dismiss a
bill seeking an injunction, recovery for unjust enrichment, and
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